The freedom's paradigm
The paradigm of human freedom has been analysed in almost all philosophical movements, evolving from the Aristotelian conception, which viewed freedom through the lens of self-determination, to existentialism. Likewise, Aristotle’s model, Saint Maximus the Confessor argued that “Man was initially made in the image of God so that he might be born with a will from the spirit and receive likeness through obeying the divine command, so that he may be both the creature of God and God through the spirit, by grace.” According to Saint Maximus the Confessor, the will is synonymous with freedom, and man has “two wings to reach heaven”: freedom and grace”. God does everything within us—virtue and gnosis, victory and wisdom, goodness and truth—without us contributing anything other than the goodwill of our will”. However, between will and grace, between man and God, there is no causal relationship; rather, man and God act synergistically.
According to the existentialist philosophical movement, freedom is human nature’s capacity to explore its own existence from the perspective of personal reflection. Man is characterised by two attributes: reflection and solitude. Although some proponents of existentialism, such as Sartre and Heidegger, excluded God from their philosophical systems, fortunately, there were also deeply Christian existentialists, such as Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky. In Kierkegaard’s view, man is analysed about himself and divinity.
Cernica, quoted by Ilie (2017), argued that human existence adheres to an existential program that guarantees an authentic human experience, which includes faith in God. The existential program oscillates between subjective self-knowledge and self-recognition through suffering, which brings man closer to the divine.
The consciousness of guilt, of “the state of sinfulness,”, is the only way man can relate to divinity.
Diaconu, quoted by Ilie (2017), emphasises that man is free precisely because freedom has been granted by the One who is perfectly free—God—so that man may remain in communion with Him. Even when sin occurs (such as Adam’s), man remains free to return to communion with God.
The original idea belongs to Kierkegaard: “Man expresses himself into freedom even in the moment of stumbling; but he is truly free only in faith. This does not mean that God-Man is inactive; He is active, as He calls to Himself. His call is not coercion. If it were, then all would be saved, we would no longer sin, we would no longer pass through existential situations, we would no longer be human beings. In faith, God-Man and man are both active: the first calls, and the second exercises his freedom, stumbling and believing. Man’s freedom in the existential situation of faith is consciousness itself.” (Ilie, 2017).
In Popa’s vision (Undated), in Christianity, freedom entails the notion of responsibility, with the two complementing each other symphonically. Levy Buhl, quoted by Popa (Undated), explains that no idea seems clearer in our spirit than the idea of responsibility. It seems to be given to us immediately by conscience, together with the idea of free will: we know we are responsible just as we know we are free, through direct intuition. From this derives the ontological character of the principle of freedom and responsibility. However, the strongest argument for this principle, according to Popa, is found in Kant’s theory of existential planes—**phenomenon** and **noumenon**—which are also applied to human nature. Thus, the will is independent of any sensory constraint (i.e., it is not subject to causal determinations); therefore, it is a product of reason (noumenon or intangible).
Thus, in Kantian terms, freedom exists only in a positive sense, just as the promoters of Greek philosophy (Aristotle, Socrates) believed. Opposed to this form of thought, which can lead to the absolutism of goodness—to its tyranny—stands the thinking of a modern theologian, quoted by Popa (Undated): God created man to call him to divinization, but this call requires a free response. In other words, “Man cannot truly love God except because he can reject Him.”
Jesus and freedom
In the pedagogy of Jesus, „knowledge of the truth is liberating” (John 8:32). Moreover, Jesus speaks of Himself as having the power to set people free: “So if the Son sets you free, you will be truly free.” (John 8:36). Jesus invites us to submit to His word, an aspect also developed by Saint Maximus the Confessor (Popa, Undated): “To will what God wills leads to our spiritual strengthening, which ensures eternity in God.” God wants us to enjoy the promised eternal life.
Conclusion:
Freedom and responsibility, as attributes of a Christian moral life, intertwine in the love of Jesus Christ (John 3:16). This ontological path leads to true freedom: “It is a way of man’s birth into God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit.”** (Popa, Undated).
Translation to Romanian
Problema libertatii omului a fost analizata in mai toate curentele filozofice, evoluand de la conceptia aristotelica, care privea libertatea prin filtrul autodeterminarii, la cea a existentialismului. Nu departe de modelul lui Aristotel, se situeaza Sf Maxim Marturisitorul.
„Omul a fost facut la inceput dupa chipul lui Dumnezeu ca sa se nasca cu vointa din duh, si sa primeasca asemanarea adusa lui prin pazirea poruncii dumnezeiesti, ca sa fie acelasi om faptura a lui Dumnezeu si Dumnezeu prin duh, dupa har”. La Sf Maxim Marturisitorul, vointa este sinonima cu libertatea, omul avand „doua aripi pentru a atinge cerul”: libertatea si harul. „Dumnezeu face totul in noi, virtutea si gnoza, victoria si intelepciunea, bunatatea si adevarul, fara ca noi sa aducem nimic altceva decat buna dispozitie a vointei”. Cu toate acestea, intre vointa si har, intre om si Dumnezeu nu exista o relatie de cauzalitate, ci omul si Dumnezeu actioneaza sinergic (Popa, Fara data).
Potrivit curentului filozofic existentialist, libertatea este capacitatea naturii umane de a explora propria existenta, din perspectiva reflectiei personale, omul caracterizandu-se prin aceste doua atribute: reflectia si singuratatea. Desi o serie din promotorii existentialismului, ca de pilda Satre ori Heidegger, au exclus pe Dumnezeu din sistemul lor de gandire, au existat, din fericire, si existentialisti profund crestini, de ex. Kiergergaard ori Dostoievski. La Kiergergaard, omul este analizat in raport cu sine, dar si cu divinitatea.
Cernica, citat de Ilie (2017) argumenta ca existenta umana se subscrie unui program existential, care garanteaza experienta umana autentica, din care face parte credinta in Dumnezeu. Programul existential penduleaza intre cunosterea umana de sine, profund subiectiva si recunoasterea de sine, prin suferinta, ce ne apropie de divin (Ilie, 2017).
Constiinta vinovatiei, a „starii de pacatosenie” este singura cale a omului de a se raporta la divinitate.
Diaconu, citata de Ilie (2017) surprinde ca omul este liber prin aceea ca libertatea a fost dobandita de la cel ce este desavarsit liber, adica Dumnezeu, pentru ca omul sa ramana in comuniune cu El. Chiar si in atunci cand intervine pacatul (de ex. cel adamic), omul este in continuare liber a se intoarce la comuniunea cu Dumnezeu.
Ideea originala ii apartine lui Kiergergaard: „Omul se exprimă ca libertate încă din situația poticnirii; dar el este liber abia în credință. Aceasta nu înseamnă că Dumnezeu-Omul nu este activ; El este activ, întrucât cheamă la Sine. Chemarea Sa nu este constrângere. Dacă ar fi astfel, atunci toți am fi mântuiți, de fapt, nu am mai păcătui, nu am mai trece prin toate situațiile existențiale, nu am mai fi ființe omenești. În credință, Dumnezeu – Omul și omul sunt activi: cel dintâi cheamă, cel de-al doilea își exercită libertatea, poticnindu-se și crezând. Libertatea omului în situația existențială a credinței este conștiința însăși” (Ilie, 2017).
In viziunea lui Popa (Fara data), in crestinism libertatea atrage dupa sine notiunea de responsabilitate, cele doua completandu-se simfonic una pe cealalta. Levy Buhl, citat de Popa (Fara data) explica faptul ca nu exista in spiritul nostru o idee mai clara, in aparenta decat ideea de responsabilitate. Se pare ca ea ne este data, in chip imediat, de constiinta, odata cu ideea de liber arbitru; noi stim ca suntem responsabili asa cum stim ca suntern liberi, printr-o intuitie directa”. Din aceasta deriva caracterul ontologic al principiului libertatii si responsabilitatii. Dar cel mai puternic argument in favoarea acestui principiu Popa il gaseste in teoria kantiana a planurilor existentiale, phainomenon si noumenon, ce se transfera si caracterului uman. Astfel, vointa este independenta de orice constrangere sensibila (adica supusa determinarilor cauzale), ca atare, ea este un produs al ratiunii (noumenon sau intangibil).
Asadar, in acceptiunea kantiana exista libertate doar in sens pozitiv, intocmai ca si promotorii filozofiei grecesti (Aristotel, Socrate). In opozitie cu aceasta forma de gandire care poate duce la absolutismul binelui, la tirania sa, se situeaza gandirea unui teolog modern, citat de Popa (Fara data): Dumnezeu l-a creat pe om pentru a-l chema la indumnezeire, aceasta chemare cerand un raspuns liber, altfel spus „Omul nu poate sa iubeasca cu adevarat pe Dumnezeu decat pentru ca el poate sa-l refuze”.
Isus si libertatea
In pedagogia lui Isus, cunoasterea adevarului are caracter eliberator (In 8, 32). Mai mult, Isus vorbeste despre sine ca avand puterea de a elibera: „Asadar, daca Fiul va va elibera veti fi cu adevarat liberi” (In 8, 36). Isus ne invita sa ne subscriem cuvantului sau, aspect dezvoltat si de Sf Maxim Marturisitorul (Popa, Fara data): a voi ceea ce voieste Dumnezeu conduce la intarirea noastra din punct de vedere spiritual, ceea ce asigura vesnicia in Dumnezeu. Dumnezeu vrea ca noi sa ne bucuram de viata vesnica promisa.
Concluzie:
Libertatea si responsabilitatea ca atribute a unei vieti morale crestine, se intrepatrund in iubirea lui Cristos Isus (In 3,16), aceasta cale fiind una a adevaratei libertati: „Este calea nasterii omului in Dumnezeu prin Iisus Hristos, in Duhul Sfant” (Popa, Fara data).